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In Kentucky, the distinction between the two kinds of statutes, and the true significance of the inquiry, whether the
death is immediate or otherwise, are even more plainly brought
out, if possible, in certain cases which evidently escaped the
notice of Judge Cooley.
In Kentucky they have (or did have when the cases about
to be referred to arose) two acts: one similar to Lord
Campbell's Act, giving a remedy by action, not, as in Massachusetts, by indictment, but requiring, except in certain cases,
the neglect causing the death, to be willful; the other providing in general terms for the survival of rights of action for
injuries to the person, subject to certain exceptions not material here.
In Louisville and Portland Canal Co. v. .MNurplhy (1872), 9
Bush. (Ky.) 522, explained in ii Id. 384, and H-ansfordAdmx.
v. Payne (1875), I1 Id. 380, actions were brought by the personal representatives of the deceased, and were, in each case,
held not maintainable under the former act, because the neglect alleged or shown was not willful; and it therefore became
material to consider whether the action could be maintained
under the latter act. In the former case the death resulted
from drowning, and it was held that no cause of action vested
in the deceased, and therefore none survived to his representatives. The death was evidently considered as immediate:
VOL. XXXVII.--33
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see remark of the Court, in I I Bush. 384, to that effect. In
the latter case the death was by poisoning, the defendant, a
druggist, having put up poison by mistake for a harmless drug,
and the Court held that, while there could be no recovery
under the act in question, when the death was practically
instantaneous or immediate, there could be a recovery in the
case at bar, as an appreciable interval of suffering elapsed between the infliction of the injury and the death. The measure
of recovery was said to be what the intestate would have been
entitled to if he had obtained relief at the moment of death.
In New York and Texas it has been held, under statutes
not different in any essential particular from Lord Campbell's
Act, that an action is maintainable in case of instant death:
Brown v. Buffalo, &c., R. R. Co. (i86o), 2,2 N. Y. 191 ; International& G. N. R. R. Co. v. Kindred (1882), 57 Tex. 491.
The contrary contention does not seem to have been considered worthy of much consideration by the Court.
In Connecticut, Tennessee and Iowa cases have arisen under
statutes having a peculiar phraseology, and which raised an
arguable question, whether an action was maintainable in case
of instant death. Under each statute the action was held
maintainable in such case. In Connecticut, Murphy v. N. Y.
& N. H. R. R. Co. (1861), 30 Conn. 184, the statute (Rev. Stat.
tit. I. § 83) provided that"Actions for injuries to the person, whether the same do or do not result in
death, shall survive to the executor or administrator."

The peculiarity of *this statute is the introduction of the
clause, "whether the same do or do note result in death." Giving these words their natural import, they add nothing to the
meaning of the enactment. They must have been inserted
with some purpose, however, and it seems probable that the
purpose was to give a right of action to the representative in
cases generally where an injury produces death, a right of
action being (rightly or wrongly) conceived by the framers of
the act as vesting in the injured person in all cases (whether
the death is immediate or otherwise), so as to be able to survive to his representatives.
There is, therefore, no fault to find with the construction
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given to the act by the Court. In the opinion in this case,
however, there appears to be the original of Judge Cooley's
comment on the Massachusetts case of Kearney v. Boston &
Worcester R. R. Co. (185 1), 9 Cush. (Mass.) io8. The Court
apparently considered the Massachusetts decision to be an obstacle in the way of reaching the conclusion which they desired to reach, and remarked, at once distinguishing and disparaging it, that it turned upon the peculiar phraseology of
the Massachusetts statute, and that the construction given was
rather nice and technical. The peculiarity, however, is in the
Connecticut, not in the Massachusetts enactment, and the construction applied in the Massachuset.s case is a very plain and
intelligible one.
The Tennessee statute was the one previously quoted, when
we were considering the question of the measure of damages.
The case of Nashville & C.R. R. Co. v. Prince (1871), 2 Heisk.
(Tenn.) 580, before cited, held that it applied to cases of instant death, overruling on that point the case of Louisville &
NashvilleR. R.Co. v. Burke (I868), 6 Cold. 45. This statute, too,
manifests an intention to give a right of action for all cases
where death is caused by a wrongful act, and criticism, if any,
would be directed, not towards the construction given by the
court carrying out that intention, but towards the questionable
assumption involved in the form of the enactment; that a
right of action always vests in the injured person, and may
therefore survive to his personal representatives.
In Iowa, the original enactment said that "whenever a

wrongful act produces death, the perpetrator is civilly liable
for the injury." In a revision of the statutes subsequently
made, these words were omitted, but all causes of action were
made to survive, provision was made as to the disposition of
damages recovered, when a wrongfid act produces death, and
it was provided that the civil remedy is not merged in the
public offense. It was evidently intended to retain the right
of action originally given, and a construction of the revision,
carrying out this intent is to be approved, however bunglingly the intention was expressed. The opinion in Conners
v. Burlington C. R. & N. Ry. Co. (1888), 74 Iowa 383, followed in Worden v. Humeston & S. 2?. Co. (887), 72 Iowa
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sustaining an action in a case of instant death, goes upon
the ground that the reasons for the common law rule, forbidding the maintenance of an action for causing death, were,
that the civil remedy is merged in the felony, that a right of
action for tort to the person, does not survive, and that, both
reasons being removed by the statute, the rule should no
longer be maintained.
The position of the Iowa Court on this subject is somewhat
like the position of those who seek to identify a statute abolishing the common law doctrine of non-survival of actions for
personal torts, with an enactment like Lord Campbell's Act,
though apparently not precisely the same. If the reasoning
of the Court were sound, it would perhaps afford som*e support to the latter position. But we cannot commend the reasoning or conclusion. The doctrines assigned as the foundaz
tion for the common law rule, do not fully account for it; and
at all events, the repeal of so well settled a rule should not be
considered as effected indirectly by repealing certain doctrines
on which it is supposed to rest.
The decision of the New Jersey Court in a recent case (Grosso
v. Delaware,L. & W P. Co. (I888), 5o N. J. L. 317), substantially supports the latter idea. Counsel claimed that the common law rule depended solely on the potion that every homicide was a felony, which merged the civil remedy, and that, as
the latter doctrine does not hold in this country at the present
day, the rule itself should be discarded. The Court, doubting
whether the reason alleged was the real and only reason for
the rule, said that" The rule has become so solidified, that whatever its original reason was, and
201,

however such reason may have ceased to exist, it cannot be judicially disregarded
or annulled, but, if injurious, its further modification must be sought from legislative action."

The question as to the extra-territorial operation of one of
these statutes may be considered to involve the question,
whether the right of action given is a new right of action or
a continuance of one existing at common law.
In the leading case of Whitford v. Panama R. R. Co., 23
N. Y. 465, decided in I86I, it was held that an action was not
maintainable in New York, under the statute of that State, for
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a death caused by the negligence of the defendant on the Isthmus of Panama, although the defendant was a corporation incorporated under the laws of New York. The decision is put
expressly upon -the ground that the statute gives a new cause
of action.
"The statute," said DENio, J., in giving' his opinion, ,'does not profess to revive his [the deceased's] cause of action in favor of the executor or administrator.
The compensation for bodily injuries remains intact, but a new grievance of a distinct nature, namely, the deprivation suffered by the wife and children, or other
relatives, of their rsatural support and protection, arises upon his death, and is
made by the statute the subject of a new cause of action," etc.

Chief Judge COMSTOCK and HOYT, J., dissented, and the
opinion of the former in another case, to which we shall presently refer, is appended to the report of this case, as showing
the grounds of his dissent.
A case arose in Vermont a few years subsequently, in 1865,
(Need/tam v. Grand Trunk R'y Co., 38 Vt. 294,) in which the
catastrophe causing the death occurred in New Hampshire;
but the death occurred in Vermont, and the decedent was a
citizen of Vermont. In Vermont, it seems, there were two
statutes: one abrogating the common law rule of non-survival
of actions for personal torts; the other, a substantial reproduc.
tion of Lord Campbell's act. In New Hampshire there were
enactments of neither kind. In considering the question of
liability, the Court inquired first, whether, under the Vermont
statutes, two actions were maintainable in case of death caused
by negligence, and, secondly, if so, whether either statute had
extra-territorial operation so as to sustain the action in the
case before the Court. The first question was answered in the
affirmative, but the second in the negative, and the action consequently failed. In the case of W9zitford v. PanamaR. R. Co.
(1861), 23 N. Y. 465, the action was brought under a statute
like Lord Campbell's Act, and it was not material to consider
whether a mere survival act would have extra-territorial operation. Here, however, it became material tQ pass upon that
question, as two descriptions of acts were before the Court. The
first question considered by the Vermont Court, as to the
maintenance of separate actions under each of the two statutes,
was merely preliminary; and, considering the position taken
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by the Court on the question of extra-territorial operation, was
not strictly necessary to the disposition of the case. It was,
however, carefully considered, and the same theory of Lord
Campbell's Act was propounded as in the New York case, that
it gives a new cause of action. In the course of the opinion,
the Court makes the following plain statement of its position
on this question:

1C
The intent of the i5th, 16th and 17th sections [substantially like Lord Campbell's Act] was to make the damage or pecuniary injury resulting from such death,
to the widow and next of kin, the subject of a new cause ot action and right of
recovery, wholly distinct from the consequences of the wrong to the injured party
and wholly distinct from his claim for damages resulting from such injury. The
provisions of the last mentioned sections have introduced principles wholly unknown
to the common law, or to any previous statute of this State, namely, that the value
of a man's life to his wife and next of kin constitutes a part of his estate, to be administered by his personal representative, and that the whole proceeds of the
recovery for such loss shall go to his widow or surviving relatives."
When the death is caused in one State and the action is
brought in another, it is held, according to the preponderance
of authority, that the action is maintainable, if both States
have statutes substantially alike, giving a right of action. This
was held in Leonardv. Columbia S. N. Co. (188 I), 84 N. Y. 48,
[followed in Debevoise v. N. Y., L. E. & W.R. R. Co. (1885), 98
Id. 379], among others, subsequent to Whitford v. PanamaR.

R. Co. (i86i), 23 N.Y. 465.
[Cooley on Torts, 2d ed., *266, states this to be the rule also in Iowa: Morris v.
C. R. . & P. R. R. Co. (1885), 65 Iowa 727; the recovery is not on the Iowa statute, but that df the place of the injury: Hyde v. W St. L. &, P. R. R. Co. (1883),
6x Id. 44.
[And in Mississippi: Chicago, St. L. 61 N. 0. R. R. Co. v. Doyle (1883), 6o
Miss. 977; IlL C. R. R. Co. v. Crudup6 (1885), 63 Id. 291. As to the administrator being the proper plaintiff under the foreign statute, the principle of the last
citation is not followed in Missouri: Vawter v. Oif. P. R. R. Co. (1884), 84 Mo.
679; but the statutes were " materially different :" HENRY, C. J., St. Joseh .
&3f. . Co. v. Leland (1886), 9° Id. 177, 182.
[And in Indiana: Butns v. Grand .Rajids& I R. R. Co. (1887), 113 Ind.
169.
[And in Pennsylvania: ffnight v. W. Jersey R. R. Co. (1885), lo8 Pa. 250.
[And in New York: supra. But in Leonard v. Columbia S. N. Co. sup ra, the
defendant was a domestic corporation, and the case was so distinguished in Robinson v. Oceanic S. N. Co. (1889), 112 N. Y. 315, which EARL, J., said, was a
case where the plaintiffs intestate was a non-resident, beii g a citizen of Massachusetts, the defendant an English corporation, and the cause of action, whichwas
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the negligent killing by . collision on the ocean, but within the jurisdiction of
Great Britain, did not arise within the State of New York; "and, therefore, no
Court within this State has jurisdiction of the action :" I& 320, 321.

These cases do not impugn the authority of the Whitford
case, in which it does not appear what the law of New Grenada
was, but, on the contrary, the question mooted in them rather
assumes that the action given by the statutes, is not, or may
not be, considered to be a survival of a common law right of
action vesting in the deceased.
Ina recent case, Debevoise v. X.Y, L.E.& W.R. R. Co. (1885),
98 N. Y. 379, the action was held not maintainable where the
accident occurred in another State, and it was not shown what
the statute of that State was, thus affirming, in effect, the Whitford case.-In the Supreme Court of the United States, the right to recover in one State, under the statutes of another State, in
which the death was caused, is maintained (Dennick v. R.R.Co.
(1880), 103 U. S. I I), upon the broad ground that the action

being transitory in its nature, a right thereof given by the statute of the State where the accident occurred can be enforced
anywhere. In fact, the two States (New York and New Jersey), in that case, had similar statutes. The action was brought
in New York under the New Jersey act.
.The question as to the right of action under the statute for
a death occurring at sea, has arisen in a number of cases, and,
in a case decided in 1879 (McDonaldv. .A alory, 77 N. Y. 546),
while the views expressed in the Whitford case were fully approved, it was held that the action could be maintained, where
the vessel on which the death occurred hailed from and was
registered in a New York port; on the theory that such a
vessel was to be regarded as carrying the law of New York
with it. Similarly, The E. B. Warejr., U. S. C. Ct., Dist. La,,
1883, 16 Fed. Repr. 255, and 17 Id. 456. To the contrary,
Armstrong v. Beadle, U. S. C. Ct., Dist. Cal., 1879, 5 Sawyer,
484,

SAWYER,

J.,

saying:

"1The statute undoubtedly creates a new right of action, and does not merely
give a remedy for a right already existing."

[After an exhaustive review of the subject, the United States
Supreme Court in The Harrisburg(I886), 119 U. S. 199, 213,
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found the case did not present this point, Chief Justice WAITE
saying" Since, however, it is now established, that, in the courts of the United States,

no action at law can be maintained for such a wrong, in the absence of a statute
giving the right, and it has not been shown that the maritime law, as accepted and
received by maritime nations generally, has established a different rule for the
government of the courts of admiralty, from those which govern courts of law in
matters of this kind, we are forced to the conclusion that no such action will lie in
the courts of the United States under the general maritime law. The rights of
persons in this particular, under the maritime law of this country, are not different
from those under the common law, and as it is the duty of courts to declare the
law, not to make it, we cannot change this rule.
"This brings us to the second branch of the question, which is, whether, with:
the statutes of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, above referred to, in force at the
time of the collision, a suit in rem could be maintained against the offending vessel, if brought in time. About this we express no opinion, as we are entirely satisfied that this suit was begun too late."

The question whether a settlement of the claim for damages,
made by the injured person in his lifetime, will bar a suit under
the statute after his death, arose in this country as early as
1857 (prior to the Whitford case), in the case of Dibblev.New
York & Erie R. R. (25 Barb. 183), in the Supreme Court of
New York. The Court, while admitting the force of the argument upon the other side, "especially when we consider the
nature of the injury which the action was designed to compensate," held that the settlement was a bar, considering the
cause of action in the two cases to be the same, although the
measure of damages was different. Said JOHNSON, J., who de0
livered the opinion"The right of action which he [the decedent] might have enforced, had he
survived the injury, upon his death accrues to his personal representatives for the
benefit of those entitled to share in his estate. *And it is given for the same wrongful act or neglect. This is the essential foundation of the action in either case.
The wrong to be redressed is the same in both cases, but the injury flowing from
the wrong to be compensated is different. The person injured is compensated for
the injury to his person, the others for the injury they sustain from the death of the
injured person. If the person injured obtains satisfaction by action, or by voluntary settlement and payment, before death ensues, the wrongful act which caused
the injury and all its consequences, past and future, are included, and the whole
canceled together, and the liability of the person inflicting the injury ended. If
not, the liability continues after, and notwithstanding the death, for the purpose of
compensating the widow and next of kin, for the injury resulting to them from the
death caused by the wrongful act. This gives but one action for the same injury
to the same person. * * * * The object of the statute, as I understand it, was to
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continue the cause of action which the person injured had,'and which he had not
enforced but might have enforced, if death had not ensued, for the benefit of the
widow and next of kin, to enable them to obtain their damages resulting from the
same primary cause and not to create an entirely new and additional right of action. The plaintiff's construction would give two actions for a single wrongful act
and frequently a double compensation for the injury flowing from it, to the same
individuals."

This case was appealed to the Court of Appeals and that
Court was equally divided in opinion regarding it, although it
was three times argued before it. No disposition seems to
have been made of the case in the Court of Appeals (see Littlevood v. Mayor of New York (1882), 89 N. Y. 24, 29, per RAPALLO, J., and ScIdichfing v. Wintgen (I881), 25 Hun. 626, 629,
per DYKMAN, J.), but the opinion of Chief Judge COMSTOCK
therein for affirmance, is printed as part of the case of Whitford v. PanamaR. R. Co., before referred to (23 N. Y. 484),
and maintains the view that the statute is "remedial, not creative," and merely changes the common law rule by which
an action for injury to the person does not survive and does
not create a new cause of action. In case of instantaneous
death, he says the theory is that there is a moment preceding
death in which the cause of action vests in the injured person.
In i881 the same question substantially arose again in theSupreme Court of New York, (Schliclting v. Wintgen, just cited),
the only difference between this case and the Dibble case being
that in this an action had been brought and a recovery had
therein by the injured person in his lifetime, whereas in the
Dibble case, as in the English case of Read v. Great Eastern
R'y Co. (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 555 (before cited, page 387), the
settlement appears to have been made out of court. It is always assumed that there is no ground for making any difference between the case of recovery by suit and settlement without suit, and probably there is no tenable ground of distinction. The Court, in consideration of the fact that the Court
of Appeals had been equally divided in the Dibble case, felt
free to follow their own views, and, adopting the theory of the
statute maintained in Vhitford v. PanamaR. R. Co., held that
the prior recovery was no bar to the action. More recently,
however, in Littlewood v. ffayor of New York (89 N. Y. 24),
decided in 1882, the contrary has been held by the Court of
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Appeals and this vexed question is thereby settled, for New
York at least, in accordance with what we have seen to be the
English law upon the point. In coming to this conclusion,
however, the Court of Appeals repudiates the theory that the
right of action given by the statute is a mere continuation in
his representatives of the right of action which the deceased
had in his lifetime, and admits that it is a new right of action,
taking the position that, irrespective of that question, it was
not intended that there should be a recovery by the representative after the deceased had himself recovered damages in his
lifetime. The opinion reviews the English cases subsequent to
Read v. Great Eastern R'y, considered herein, and finds nothing in them inconsistent with that case.
In Kentucky, where, as we have seen, there are two statutes,
one providing generally for the survival of rights of action for
injury to the person, and the other similar to Lord Campbell's
Act, but limiting the remedy in a certain class of cases to instances of wilful negligence, it is held that the pendency of a
suit brought by the administratrix under the former statute to
recover damages for the suffering of the intestate prior to his
death, is a bar to a subsequent action under the latter statute:
Conner'sAdm'zv. Pazl(1876), 12 Bush. (Ky.) i44. This holding had been foreshadowed in the case of Hansford'sAdm'z
v.Payne (previously cited), decided the year before, in which it
was objected to allowing a recovery under the survival statute,
where the plaintiff failed to make out a case under the other
statute, that such a ruling would enable parties to sue and recover under both statutes; but the Court replied that that result would not follow, but that a recovery under either statute
would bar a subsequent action under the other. Said the Court
in the Conner case:
" The acts causing the death of the party, from eith'er the willful or ordinary

negbgence of the party charged, constitute but one cause of action, whether the
measure of recovery sought is for the suffering of the intestate during his life, or
for the willful negligence causing his death. Different degrees of negligence cannot be established from the same acts of the party charged, so as to create differ-

ent causes of action in favor of the party injured, or the injuries resulting fiom
such negligence so severed as to create distinct causes of action by the same person. The statute has only enlarged the remedy and given to parties a cause of
action unknown to the common law. The party entitled to bring the action, either
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at common law or under the statute, must make his election; and while the right
of recovery under our statute for willful negligence may increase the measure of
recovery, such an action is a bar to a cause of action that survived at common law
upon the same facts. The acts constituting the wrong being inseparable, a recovery by the administrator for the mental and bodily suffering of the intestate is a
bar to any proceeding under the statute, either by the personal representative or
the next of kin."

The opinion in a recent Illinois case enforces the view that
the right of action given by the statute, giving damages for the
benefit of the relatives, is a continuance of the common law
right of action belonging to the decedent, and that two recoveries cannot be had: Holton v. Daly, Admr'z (1883), io6 Ill.
131.
"The cause of action is plainly the wrongful act, neglect or default causing
death, and not merely the death itself. Damages are recoverable, not for the killing, but, as was observed by COMSTOCK, J., in Dibble v. N. Y. & ErieR. R. Co.,
as quoted by him in his dissent in Whifordv. Panama R. R. Co., 23 N. Y. 486,
' notwithstanding, or in spite of, the death which ensues. The statute recognizes
but one cause of suit and that is the wrong done irrespective of its consequences.'
* * * A right of action which at common law would have terminated at the
death, is continued for the benefit of the wife, husband, etc., and its scope enlarged to embrace the injury resulting from the death. * * * * It is not to be presumed it was intended that there should be two causes of action in distinct and
different rights by the same party plaintiff for the same wrongful act, neglect or
default." (per SCHOLFIELD, J., pp. 137, 140).

The question arising for decision in this case, was as to the
right of the administratrix of the plaintiff in an action for personal injuries, to be substituted as plaintiff, after the death of
her intestate, pending the action, from the effect of the injuries
which were the subject of the action, and to maintain the action for the damages suffered by the intestate, the original
plaintiff, up to the time of his death. With the effect and apparently the intention of preventing a double recovery, the
Court held that a recovery could not be had by the administratrix (she having been substituted as plaintiff), upon the
basis referred to, notwithstanding the fact that there was, in
addition to an act like Lord Campbell's Act, a statute making
actions for injury to the person survive. The Court reached
this result by holding that the statute last named should be
confined in its operations, although unqualified in its terms, to
cases where the former act did not apply; that is, to cases where
the death resulted not from the injury complained of, but from
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some other cause. The lower Court had overruled a motion
to dismiss, made after the substitution of the administratrix as
plaintiff. This ruling, the Supreme Court held, could not be
impugned, as it did not then appear of record what the cause
of plaintiff's death was; but, it being shown by the evidence
on the trial, that the cause of the death was in fact the injuries
complained of, the Supreme Court held that the administratrix
was in the same position which she would have occupied had
she begun the suit originally under the act giving damages for
causing death; and that, therefore, instructions allowing the
jury to give a verdict upon the basis of the damages sustained
by the intestate up to the time of his death, were, although excluding the death itself as an element of damages, erroneous.
This case well illustrates the violence which is done to the language of enactments, and the inconsistencies in which the
courts become involved in the effort to limit the plaintiffs
remedy to a single action. With two laws on the statute-book,
either of which might be supposed to supply any deficiencies
of the other, one providing as plainly and unqualifiedly as language can, that rights of action for injury to the person shall
survive, it would be thought that a recovery could be had, after
the death of an injured person, of the same damages which
he could have recovered in his lifetime. Yet, in an action
originally begun by the injured person in his lifetime, such recovery is denied; and the administratrix is remitted, as her
sole remedy, to another suit, in which the rule of damages will
exclude the damages suffered by the intestate himself In one
breath, the Court asserts that the act merely continues the
common law right of action which the deceased had, and in
the next actually reverses the judgment below because the action begun by the decedent in his lifetime was allowed to be
revived and continued as begun, after his death.
In Kansas, as in Illinois, it has been held that the survival
act does not apply to cases where the death results from the
wrongful act complained of: McCarthy v. R. R. Co. (1877),
18 Kan. 46, but recently Judge BREVER, sitting as United
States Circuit Judge for Kansas, has doubted the correctness
of the decision of the Kansas Supreme Court: Hulbert v. Topeka(I888),34 Fed. Repr. 5 io, although he himself was a mem-
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ber of the latter Court, when the decision was made, and concurred in the judgment. He now declares himself in favor of
the opposite view, although bound to yield to the authority of
the decision of the State Court. Referring to the two sections
of the Code, § 420, providing for the survival of actions for
personal injuries, and § 422, for the recovery of damages for
causing death, he says:
"The measure of damages and the basis of recovery under the two sections are
entirely distinct. Section 422 gives a new right of action-one not existing before; an action which is not founded on survivorship; an action which takes no
account of the wrong done to the decedent, but one which gives to the widow, or
next of kin, damages which have been sustained by reason of the wrongful taking
away of the life of the deceased."

In accord with the opinion of Judge BREWER, and opposed
to the holding of the Illinois and Kansas Supreme Courts, is
a recent decision in Mississippi: Ficksburg & MR. Co. v. Pn/lips (1887), 64 Miss. 693, in which, under a similar condition
of the statute law as exists in Illinois and Kansas, an administratrix, not being one of the relatives entitled to recover
damages for a death, was held entitled to sue under the survival act, in a case where the decedent had died from the injury complained of, CAMPBELL, J., said:
"Section 1510 provides for an action to recover for the death of a person, and
it is entirely distinct from and independent of an action by the personal representative. They may co-exist but have no connection. * * * It is manifest that the
death of Jo ]3rantley [the intestate], did not destroy the right of action ; for had
he commenced an action, it would have survived."

The qualification impliedly annexed to the survival act, by
the decisions of the Illinois and Kansas Courts, recalls the decisions of the Maine Court: (State v. Maine CentralR. R. Co.
(1872), 6o Me. 490; State v. Grand Trunk R'y Co. (1873), 6I
Id. 114), restricting the operation of the other act (the one
giving damages for causing death), by supposing it to refer
only to cases of instantaneous death; that is, where there would
be no room for the operation of the survival act. The Maine
decisions accomplish the result aimed at, viz., preventing a
double recovery, even more effectually than those of Illinois
and Kansas, as they not only render two actions after death
impossible, but limit the opportunity for any action after death
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for the benefit of the relatives, to cases where there was no
opportunity for an action before death.
A Massachusetts decision (Comm. v. MetropolitanR. R. Co.
(1871), 107 Mass. 236), also stands opposed to the Maine decisions. The Massachusetts case seems to have been rightly
decided; the others appear to take an unwarrantable liberty
with the text of the law.
The position that an action is maintainable under each statute separately, was maintained with great force of reasoning
in the Vermont case of Needham v. Grand Trunk R'y Co.
(1865), 38 Vt. 294, where the question was considered incidentally. Among other things, it was pointed out in the
opinion in that case that one result of holding an action under
the act, modeled after Lord Campbell's Act, to bar an action
under the survival act, would be to deprive creditors of a decedent, who survived an injury for some time, and finally, perhaps after being impoverished by a long sickness, died from
the effects of it, of a fund which would otherwise be applicable
to the payment of their claims; as the damages recovered
under the former act would go to the widow and next of kin,
free from the claims of creditors. This objection is a grave
one and is very suggestive. The difficulty lies in the fact that
the fund recoverable under one act (supposing that there are
two acts, as we have seen to be the case in not a few States),
has not the same destination as that recoverable under the
other, the one belonging to the family free from the claims of
creditors (this is almost invariably provided in acts like Lord
Campbell's Act), and the other belonging to the estate generally, and being therefore subject to the claims of creditors in
the first instance. If only one action or one settlement is allowable, then the executor, or administrator (in case he alone
is authorized to sue), has the power to prefer one class to another; and, if others than the executor or administrator are
authorized to sue (as is sometimes done), mere priority of action on the part of the representatives of the one class, will
operate to deprive the other class of a just claim. In the Kentucky case of Conner's Adm'x, v. Paul(1876), 12 Bush. (Ky,)
144, for example, the course taken by the administratrix in
suing under the survival act for damages for the suffering, etc.,
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of deceased, prior to the time of his death, might have resulted, and perhaps did result, under the decision of the Court,
in depriving the relatives of the compensation to which, under
the statute, they were entitled, and which, it would seem, they
could not justly be deprived of by any arbitrary act of the administratrix; and, on the other hand, if the administratrix had
sued under the other act, the creditors (supposing the estate
to be insolvent), would have been deprived of assets to which
they were justly entitled. The Court, in the Needham case,
said, with good reason, that
"The principle, that a wrong resulting in death, affords, under these statutes,
two distinct causes of suit, obviates many difficulties that would arise under a different rule."

It should be mentioned that in Massachusetts the Supreme
Court, in holding the act of 1881, giving a remedy by civil
action against carriers and towns for negligently causing loss
of life, to be prospective only, and not to apply to past cases,
said that the act gave a new remedy, additional to the remedy
by indictment: Kelley v. Boston & Mlaine R.R. Co. (1883), 135
Mass. 448.
The Court had previously, and before the passage of the act
of 1881, avoided expressing an opinion as to what effect a recovery by the party injured, or his representatives, would have
upon the prosecution of an indictment under their statute:
Comm. v. MetropolitanR.R.Co. (1878), 107 Mass. 236, 237, per
COLT, J.

In Pennsylvania there is a statute which expressly makes
the right of action conditional upon no action having been
brought by the injured person in his lifetime: Act 15 April,
1851, § I, P. L. 674.
It has been held in Barley v. Chicago & A. R.R. Co. (1865),
U. S. C. Ct, N. Dist. II., 4 Biss. 430, that a recovery by a
father for the loss of the services of his minor son, by reason
of an injury to the latter which resulted in his death, was no
bar to an action by the father, as administrator, to recover,
under the statute, for the son's death. This holding is correct,
under any theory of the statute, as the father's claim for loss
of services of the son is entirely independent of and co-exists
with the son's personal claim for damages, and two distinct
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actions are maintainable in the son's lifetime. In Iowa, however, a curious condition of the statute law produced a curious
result. In addition to a general act, imposing liability for
wrongfully causing death, there was an act providing that the
father, or mother, might sue for loss of services resulting from
an injury to, or the death of, a minor child; and, in that state
of the law, it was held that a father, suing as administrator
under the former act, to recover for causing the death of his
minor son, could only recover for the value of his son's life
after majority, as the latter act covered the time previous to
his majority: Walters v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. (1873), 36
Iowa 458.
To summarize the decisions upon the question of the right
to maintain two actions for an injury causing death (exclusive
of a husband's, or father's, action for loss of service by reason
of injury to wife, or child), the cases stand thus: A recovery
by an injured person in his lifetime will bar an action by his
representatives after his death, according to the decisions in
England and New York, where alone the question has arisen.
The maintenance of separate actions after the death, for the
benefit of the estate, and of the family respectively, under the
two species of statutes, viz., the survival act and Lord Campbell's Act, is avoided in certain States, viz., Maine, Illinois and
Kansas, by so construing the two statutes that they can not
both apply to the same case, a restrictive construction being
given to what takes the place of Lord Campbell's Act in Maine,
and a restrictive construction being given to the survival act
in Illinois and Kansas. The same result is reached in Kentucky, by holding an action under either of the two statutes to
preclude the maintenance of an action under the other. The
restrictive construction of the one statute, adopted in Maine, is,
however, rejected in Massachusetts ;. and the restrictive construction of the other statute, adopted in Illinois and Kansas,
is rejected in Mississippi and condemned upon principle by the
United States Circuit Judge for Kansas. The Vermont Court
stands committed to the view that separate actions are maintainable under each of the two statutes.
CHARLES
(To be continued.)
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